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I. Introduction: What is coexistence? -From moratorium to partial moratorium
The European Union tried to establish a "coexistence" policy for the cultivation and processing of GM and non-GM products after the political agreement that put an end to the 1999-2004 moratorium. Consequently, coexistence is part of this gentlemen's agreement between States with pro and anti-GMO positions. Anti-GMO States unblocked proceedings of authorisation of new products by accepting the sound science criteria of the risk assessments of the EFSA as almost the only element to open the doors of the internal market. In exchange, these States got the opportunity to decide on how GMO would be cultivated in their jurisdiction, mainly under the pretext of guaranteeing the isolation of the three chains in "coexistence" 2 .
As this article will demonstrate, this basic agreement has not changed.
According to the rather soft-law attempt of harmonization of the 2003 Recommendation of the European Commission, "coexistence refers to the ability of farmers to make a practical choice between conventional, organic and GM-crop production, in compliance with the legal obligations for labelling and/or purity standards". That is to say, Member States could set up binding and/or non-binding good practices of isolation in order to guarantee farmers' right of choice and compliance with [European] labelling and traceability standards (the 0.9 % threshold). Moreover, in some cases, Member States established specific liability rules to compensate for economic loss in case an "adventitious mixture" could not be avoided.
This was a project of "pluralisme technologique" 3 that aimed at avoiding a rapid technological substitution of conventional crops by GM ones, and at guaranteeing the survival of organic production that had renounced biotechnological tools.
Although the idea of slowing down technological substitution is based on the precaution principle and in spite of its political origin, coexistence policy was always based on the objective of avoiding "economic" losses caused by an adventitious mixture. However, under no circumstances should national coexistence rules or special arrangements for liability prevent or excessively burden GM production. From the 2003 recommendation until the present day, the European Commission has tried to promote a field-by-field segregation policy where good practices of coexistence should not go beyond the 0.9 % rule. Theoretically GMO-free and GMO exclusive production zones could only be established by private agreements among farmers, which have proven to be very difficult to achieve in practice.
However, that strategy did not work. Some anti-GMO countries (the best example is Austria) used the flexibility of the coexistence policy to adopt very strict coexistence rules. It is difficult to discern how these would operate in practise, since many of these countries also used the safeguard clause of Directive 2001/18. Consequently, in those cases, the national coexistence rules were part of a partial moratorium strategy. In cases where there was no safeguard clause (for example in Germany before April 2009), severe coexistence rules combined with a strict liability scheme significantly reduced the introduction of GM production, because field-by-field isolation costs (and compensation risks) were higher than the economic advantages of GM production. In GMO friendly countries (Spain) there were and still are no coexistence rules; the technological substitution process therefore took place rapidly. The only country where there was something similar to coexistence was Portugal. There the government, seed companies, and farmers' associations worked together to create GMO-free regions and GMO production zones.
Nevertheless, even in that case, problems with reaching a consensus among all farmers made it difficult to establish GMO-free regions (finally they were established only on the island of Madeira and in the Lagos district in the Algarve).
After seven years of "coexistence" policy several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it is very difficult to separate safety from socio-economic arguments whenever we talk about food products; secondly, without binding isolation rules the technological substitution process is inevitable; and thirdly, fieldby-field segregation is too complicated and its costs overtake the economic advantage of the new technology, which necessarily leads to a region by region strategy 3 . In this context, and without having taken action against clearly disproportionate national legislation on "coexistence" 4 , the European Commission decided to change its strategy and replace its 2003 Recommendation as part of the 2010 Reform. This paper will analyse the main innovations of the 2010 Recommendation and the impact it has on coexistence policy.
II. Main innovations of the 2010 recommendation and their immediate impact
The new 2010 Recommendation 5 replaces the one from 2003/556/EC. Nevertheless, key elements of the coexistence policy remain in force. Both Recommendations are founded on Article 26a of Directive 2001/18 (which has not been changed by the reform) and, consequently, essential elements of the coexistence policy are still applicable. These are namely the avoidance of the unintended presence of GMOs in other products, the guarantee of the right of choice between different technologies of food production thanks to a label/traceability system and finally the establishment of a threshold for drawing boundaries between them 6 . However, in the new Recommendation, the European Commission reduces its target of harmonization, 7 allowing Member States to develop a more flexible approach in the establishment of measures to guarantee isolation. In particular, according to the new Recommendation, Member States can "take into account their regional and national specificities and particular local needs of conventional, organic and other types of crops and products." In practice, this recognises the legitimacy to protect voluntary GM-free labelling and below 0.9 % thresholds as well as the legality of GMO-free regions created because of the characteristics of farm structures or natural conditions in a region.
Nevertheless, more flexibility does not mean absolute freedom or, in other words, a "re-nationalisation" of the coexistence policy. Article 26a of Directive 2001/18 establishes the limits of the flexibility Member States have in the avoiding a "potential economic impact of the admixture of GM and non-GM crops". Consequently, States should still not eliminate one type of production in their whole territory, at least basing this prohibition on coexistence grounds 8 . However, it must be acknowledged that more flexibility will increase the possibility of abuse and the establishment of trade restricting measures. Consequently, the proportionality requirements that were already present in Recommendation 2003/556/ EC will necessary acquire more relevance in Recommendation 2010/C 200/01.
Consumer choice as Leitmotiv
of the new strategy and the dilution of the 0.9 % rule
The 2003 Recommendation focused its attention on the diversity in supply and defined coexistence as the "ability of farmers to make a practical choice between conventional, organic, and GM-crop production". Although consumer choice was "linked to" coexistence, it had not been included in that definition. Thus, several national legislations 9 filled the gap and put consumers' choice at the same level as farmers' freedom by including it in their definition of coexistence.
The emphasis of the 2003 Recommendation on farmers' right of choice explains why it did not support compulsory coexistence measures to guarantee below 0.9 % thresholds or GM-free labelling. Such measures would be so restrictive that they would in practise necessarily entail a prohibition of GM cultivation, thereby reducing farmer choice. In fact, the 0.9 % rule was a political agreement to guarantee diversity. Not only does it establish the boundaries between GM and non-GM production, but it also reduces the cost of isolation by introducing a margin of tolerance in the event of adventitious presence. Since there is no GMO labelling obligation below 0.9 %, in case of an adventitious presence below this threshold, there would be no economic loss. Therefore, according to the 2003 Recommendation, there would be no need to have compulsory coexistence rules. However, this would not prevent specific production with a threshold below 0.9 % whenever private agreements would establish such a production.
The new Recommendation completely changes this strategy and centres the diversity guidelines on demand rather than on supply. According to the new definition, co-existence measures are those that aim "to allow consumers and producers a choice between conventional, organic and GM production"
10 . Although the wording seems to put consumers and producers on an equal footing, in practise it puts consumers in a stronger position since they can determine the threshold among the three types of production mentioned, and even expand the scope of protection to new ones such as GM-free products: Thus, the right of producers is determined by consumers, and more precisely, by the existence (or lack thereof) of consumers who demand 100 % GM-free products. Only in case there is a market demand for below 0.9 % products would the new 2010 Recommendation allow Member States to protect that production by establishing compulsory isolation measures as strict as necessary. The declaration of GM-free regions would be the strictest of these legal isolation measures. In this scenario the right of choice of farmers would be seriously reduced because they would not be able to cultivate using GM; but the right of choice of consumers would remain intact since they could still buy imported GM products. It seems that this change of approach encouraged a change in the department of the European Commission charged with the coexistence policy. While the 
Diversity of farming conditions,
the new approach regarding organic farming, and the reinforcement of the GMO free regions doctrine
Until now, the scientific risk assessment for authorisation 12 as well as the former coexistence Recommendation 13 took local particularities into account. In the risk assessment it is possible to avoid the introduction of GM in a particular region if the new product could somehow endanger the local environmental characteristics (local flora or fauna), which is very difficult to prove in practice. Under the Recommendation special farming structures could justify stricter isolation measures, but only to achieve the 0.9 threshold applicable for both conventional and organic production. That is to say, it could restrict coexistence but not prohibit the cultivation of GMOs 14 . However, some countries (Austria, Hungary, Italy) and, in particular, local and regional authorities of the GMO-free region network 15 considered these measures to be insufficient and they have argued for the necessity of establishing GM free regions to protect their farming systems.
The new 2010 Recommendation responds to these demands and puts special emphasis on the diversity of farm structures and farming systems, and on the economic and natural conditions under which farmers in the EU operate. It acknowledges that particular segregation needs are very difficult and costly to implement efficiently in some geographical areas, which makes it necessary to give Member States sufficient flexibility. This declaration is not incompatible with the former recommendation per se. However, the new Recommendation does go further in this matter, separating the natural connection between threshold and isolation measures, and recognizing the possibility of establishing stricter isolation measures for quality products, such as organic ones. The Recommendation does not say that organic farming should have a below 0.9 % threshold 16 , something that is likely to be under discussion as we speak. However, it affirms, "since [organic] production is often more costly, stricter segregation efforts to avoid GMO presence may be necessary to guarantee the associated price premium". However, in combination with the particularities of farm structures these stricter isolation measures would almost certainly lead to the declaration of GM-free regions. The point is that these GM-free regions will not be based on a particular threshold or a measurable data, but on consumers' expectations created by premium quality products. The lack of a clear threshold to control the proportionality of the isolation measures and the possibility of creating binding and restrictive rules based on quality grounds would almost surely have important trade related consequences.
The renewed importance of the proportionality test
Proportionality control can be divided into three tests according to the jurisprudence of the ECJ
17
: adequacy 18 (of the measure attaining its objective), necessity 19 (the impossibility of achieving the objective with less restrictive measures) and strictu sensu proportionality 20 (of the objective itself). In the former Recommendation, proportionality controls were quite easy to implement. There was only one threshold, and consequently only one objective to be pursued. All the isolation measures that went beyond this objective did not fulfil the adequacy test. Moreover, if the threshold could be reached through less restrictive measures, the measure did not fulfil the necessity test. No one questioned the strictu sensu proportionality of the objective itself since it was established by the European legislation.
However, with the new 2010 approach, the 0.9 % threshold is not always the "objective" to attain. Now Member States can develop new and stricter isolation measures to protect special crops (for example "GM-free" ones) and even prohibit the cultivation of GMOs entirely if the combination of special farming structure plus the expectation of consumers (in terms of quality) demands measures that are as strict as possible.
Consequently, to apply the adequacy and the necessity tests now it is necessary to identify what the "objective" is and to give it a measurable score (the standard of 0.9 %, 0.1 %, technical zero). Contrary to the former Recommendation, currently the objective of the national coexistence law could be disproportionate per se in relation to EU freedom of goods (strictu sensu proportionality test). This is why objectives that are stricter than the European standard (0.9 % level) need special justification arguments.
Once the objective is determined, it is quite easy to establish if the threshold (adequacy test) is reached, and to compare the proposed measures with other possible measures (necessity test); naturally while "taking into account the regional and local constraints and characteristics, such as the shape and size of the fields in a region, the fragmentation and geographical dispersion of fields belonging to individual farms, and regional farm management practices"
21
. Once compared, if these measures were the least restrictive ones, they would be proportionate. The Recommendation includes a particular requirement of argumentation concerning GM-free areas
22
, showing that they should be analyzed under stricter standards of proportionality than other coexistence measures. In practice, the proportionality test will be applied through the notification requirements of Directive 98/34.
Finally, even though the 2010 Recommendation affirms that matters concerning financial compensation or liability for economic damage fall within the exclusive competence of Member States
23
, they would never be excluded from the control of proportionality since even in areas of national competence, Member States are still required to comply with EU law and with Articles 35/36 TFEU and related case law in particular 24 .
III. Concluding remarks
From a political point of view it is clear that the new strategy of the European Commission is based on pragmatism. As Dr. Poli says, things probably will not change in the immediate future 25 . Offender countries have obtained a way to legalize their measures while GM producing countries (both from within the EU and from outside) can continue selling their crops for consumption. Nevertheless, it is interesting to analyse the legal arguments underpinning this change and their consequences in the event of a radicalization of positions.
Firstly, nowadays, the policy of coexistence centres more on consumers' choice than on farmers' choice. Guaranteeing the viability of premium products plus the particularities of farm structures could justify the restriction in the GM supply. But, at the same time, it could consolidate premium quality products (organic and GM-free), which would increase supply. Market demand will therefore encourage supply with the support of more responsive authorities.
Secondly, the 0.9 % rule has been diluted, but it continues to be the European standard that guides European Coexistence Bureau Recommendations on best practices 26 . Any coexistence measure founded on a different objective should be justified in terms of proportionality.
Thirdly, the coexistence policy is not being renationalized 27 (mainly because it has never been harmonized at an EU level), but it is becoming increasingly flexible and closer to the SPS Agreement philosophy 28 . In both cases compliance with international/European standards should presuppose the compatibility of the measure with trade law. Thus, if a Member aims to establish a measure that is stricter than the standard one, it would have to prove the necessity of a higher objective and the proportionality of the measures taken to achieve it.
Finally, the success of the whole scheme depends on the strength of proportionality controls at EU levels. It is probable that these controls will be weak in relation to GM-reluctant countries, mainly because they have the opt-out clause in any case. However, from a long-term perspective, the consolidation of large GMO-free regions in Europe could cause tensions in WTO law. Almost surely there will be trade implications regarding GM seeds and very probably there will be indirect discrimination effects against GM products. Moreover if national authorities avoid the use of GM feed in livestock breeding in their GMO-free regions, legal friction with international trade law seems inevitable.
In conclusion, it seems that the 2010 Recommendation will consolidate the current concentration process between GM-free and GM-exclusive production regions. However, if these are well distributed from an EU point of view the original objectives of the coexistence policy would be guaranteed. 27 On the contrary, see Sara Poli in this issue.
28 It is true that the SPS agreement is focused on sanitary and phytosanitary risks while the coexistence policy focuses on socioeconomic risks. However, taking into account that SPS measures could include measures to prevent economic damages produced by the presence of GMO whenever they are unwelcome (EC-Biotechnological Products, Panel Report, WTO Docs WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006, at para. 7.2576), there are some possible connections between them.
